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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
lent crimes in devising punishments. 27 The Court would not have so
readily excluded a consideration of these factors if it had relied on the
utilitarian goals- deterrence and retribution to prevent anarchy-put
forth in Gregg. Clearly, aggravating factors such as multiple offenses are
relevant in determining a sentence designed to deter future crime.
28
Not only is Coker disturbing because of the opinion's unconvincing
combination of subjective and objective factors which result in the deci-
sion's indeed "appear[ing] to be merely the subjective views of individual
justices,' 29 but the Coker decision also seems to have ramifications be-
yond prohibiting the death penalty for rape. The dissenters interpreted
the plurality opinion as implying that death cannot be imposed as a pen-
alty for crimes not resulting in the death of the victim,30 and this conclu-
sion is certainly consistent with the plurality's language. Therefore, if the
Court adheres to the reasoning employed in Coker, it will conclude that
present state and federal statutes imposing the death penalty for such
crimes as the rape of a child, 31 armed robbery,32 kidnapping, 33 airplane
hijacking34 and treason 35 are violations of the eighth amendment.
Constance R. LeSage
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN CHURCH SCHOOLS
Plaintiffs, black parents and their two children, brought suit against
defendant, a church school operating on church property, I seeking dam-
ages and an injunction in response to defendant's refusal to admit the
27. 97 S. Ct. at 2874 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. See id.; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. 97 S. Ct. at 2865-66; see text at note 10, supra.
30. 97 S. Ct. at 2880 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp.
1974).
32. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1902 (1968).
33. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1311 (1968); LA. R.S. 14:44
(1950).
34. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). The statute provides the death penalty in
hijacking cases only when a person is killed, but requires no intent to kill.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970).
1. Defendant, Dade Christian Schools, Inc., was founded by the New Testament Bap-
tist Church and both the school and the church use the same building. Brown v. Dade
Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1977).
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children because of their race. Plaintiffs' suit was based on the contention
that 42 U.S.C. § 19812 prohibited discrimination by private schools on
the basis of race. While denying the statute's application to private
schools, defendant contended in the alternative that its admission policy
was based on the religious beliefs of its members and that their right to
the free exercise of their religion excused defendant's discrimination.
The trial court held that the statute did apply to private schools and
granted the relief prayed for after focusing on defendant's institutional
beliefs and finding that the policy of exclusion was based on a social
policy or philosophy rather than a religious tenet. In an en banc hearing,
a plurality of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the reasoning
and judgment of the trial court. Concurring in the result, one judge
found that the admissions policy was based on the religious beliefs of the
individual members, but concluded that the free exercise claim was out-
weighed by the substantial public interest represented by section 1981.
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." The establish-
ment clause has been interpreted as creating a wall of separation be-
tween church and state,3 while the free exercise clause was originally
interpreted as providing complete protection for religious beliefs, but no
protection for unlawful actions based on religious beliefs.4 This interpre-
tation of the free exercise clause granted no more protection to religious
adherents than is presently provided by the first amendment guaranty of
free speech.5 Gradually the free exercise clause has been interpreted as
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970): "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other."
3. Eg., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1972); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Schempp, the Supreme Court stated that "to with-
stand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 374 U.S. at 222. Since
Schempp, Walz and Lemon have added a further requirement that there not be an exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion.
4. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech. ... This guaranty provides full protection for expression of
religious belief. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 158-61 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
19781
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providing more and more protection for religiously based action where
such action does not seriously undermine the public good. 6 The result of
this gradual development has been a balancing test that weighs the inter-
ests of society against the individual's right to the free exercise of his
religion.7
Reynolds v. United States,8 the first case to construe the free exercise
clause, involved a challenge to a bigamy conviction as a violation of the
free exercise right on the basis that the bigamous marriage was entered
into in compliance with what was conceived to be religious duty. The
Supreme Court held that the purpose of the religion clauses was to pre-
vent the federal government from infringing on religious beliefs, but that
no protection was afforded illegal conduct, regardless of its religious mo-
tivation.9 This belief/action distinction remained completely intact until
Cantwell v. Connecticut.'0 Although deciding the case on free speech
grounds as well, the Supreme Court held that the religion clauses in-
cluded both absolute protection for beliefs and some protection for ac-
tions, with the proviso that the state had the power to regulate actions for
society's protection as long as the state did not unduly infringe upon the
protected freedom. "
The first major decision to extend the protection of the religion
clauses to religiously motivated actions was Sherbert v. Verner.12 In that
case a Seventh Day Adventist who was unable to find work because her
religion forbade her to work on Saturday was denied unemployment
compensation on the ground that she had refused to accept available
work. The Supreme Court held that denying benefits on this basis consti-
tuted an unconstitutional burden on her right to the free exercise of her
444, 448-51 (1938); Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1123 (1973).
The free speech guaranty protects expression of religious belief, so the free exercise clause,
if limited to protection of belief only, provides no additional protection.
6. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). But see Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). As the extent of governmental regulation increased there
also developed an increased need for protection of religiously motivated action in order to
preserve religious liberty. Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal De-
velopment: Part . The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1967).
7. Gianella, supra note 6, at 1386.
8. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
9. Id at 166.
10. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In Cantwell, the Court held that the religion clauses of the first
amendment were included in the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment and were
therefore applicable to the states. Id. at 303.
11. Id. at 304.
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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religion. Sherbert reflected a much greater concern for the right to free
exercise than any of the previous cases,' 3 in that the Court formulated a
test which required either that there be no infringement of the free exer-
cise right, or that "any incidental burden on the free exercise of appel-
lant's religion . . . be justified by a 'compelling state interest . . . .' ",4
This test required a balancing of the individual's interests against those
of the state with the scales weighted in favor of the individual.
A solid reaffirmation of Sherbert came nine years later in Wisconsin
v. Yoder. I5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had reversed the convictions
of several Amish parents who because of religious beliefs had violated
the state's compulsory attendance law by refusing to send their children
to secondary schools. The Supreme Court affirmed after undertaking a
delicate balancing of interests and stating that "only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion."' 16
In both Sherbert and Yoder, cases involving well-established reli-
gions, the Supreme Court had no difficulty determining that the beliefs
in question were religious beliefs. However, in other instances, particu-
larly cases involving conscientious objectors and tax exemptions for re-
ligious institutions, the courts have been forced to struggle with the
difficulties of defining religion in order to distinguish protected religious
13. Only two years earlier, in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Supreme
Court had demonstrated far less concern for infringements on the right of free exercise.
The burden on Braunfeld was perhaps even greater than the burden on Sherbert. Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). Despite this, the Court in
Braunfeld denied the free exercise claim, holding that an incidental infringement on an
individual's free exercise was constitutional where the challenged statute was a general
secular regulation within the state's power, unless its purpose could be accomplished with-
out a burden on the right of free exercise. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
14. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), quoting from NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
15. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Between Sherbert and Yoder two state cases had followed
Sherberts more protective approach. Prior to Sherbert, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
denied a claim that the right of free exercise allowed an exemption from jury duty. In re
Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
for further consideration in light of Sherbert. In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963). On remand
the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the free exercise claim until it was shown that the
granting of the exemptions would place a significant burden on the functioning of the jury
system. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
The California Supreme Court followed Sherbert in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Reptr. 69 (1964) (granting the Native American Church an exemption
from the prohibition of the use of peyote and allowing the church members to use the drug
for religious purposes).
16. 406 U.S. at 215.
19781
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beliefs and actions based upon them from other beliefs and actions that
are not protected by the free exercise clause. 17 The courts have only re-
luctantly inquired into what constitutes a religion because of the inherent
tension between such an inquiry and the establishment clause.' 8
For many years it was accepted that the touchstone for finding the
existence of a religion was a belief in a Supreme Being, 19 but eventually
some courts held that such a belief was not an essential prerequisite to
statutory tax exemptions for buildings used solely for religious wor-
ship.20 In this context, one court developed an institutional definition of
religion requiring that there be some sort of belief, not necessarily in-
cluding a belief in a supernatural power, held by a group that openly
expresses the belief, derives a moral practice from it, and is organized in
a fashion designed to foster adherence to its tenets. 2' In the selective
service context, the debate has centered around the statutory exemption
from the draft for conscientious objectors. 22 In Seeger v. United States,23
17. Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
479, 480 (1968); Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection. Antiquated Oddity or
Vital Reality, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 15, 16 (1973); Comment, Defining Religion. Of God the
Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Defin-
ing Religion].
18. There is an inherent tension between the free exercise clause and the establishment
clause in cases in which the former is interpreted as extending some protection to relig-
iously based action. So interpreted, the free exercise clause requires that a particular belief
be examined to determine whether it is religious and that its importance to the adherent be
examined in order to balance the adherent's interests against society's interests. It has been
suggested that any exemption from a general law for religiously motivated action would
violate the establishment clause. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961). However, the Supreme Court has held that where the free
exercise clause requires an exemption the establishment clause does not forbid it. Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
However, the tension still remains because the establishment clause forbids favoring one
religion over another. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953); see note 3, supra.
Whenever a particular belief is examined to determine whether it is religious and how
important it is to the individual there is a risk that one religion will be treated differently
than another, thereby violating the establishment clause's prohibition of favoritism.
19. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting
on another point); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Boyan, supra note 17, at 481-
82; Defining Religion, supra note 17, at 535.
20. Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
21. Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 692-93, 315
P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
22. Section 5(g) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 exempted those who
are "by reason of religious training and belief.., conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form." 54 Stat. 889, § 5(g) (1940) (codified in 50 App. U.S.C. § 305 prior to
expiration in 1947). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had implied that a belief in a
NOTES
the Supreme Court interpreted the requirement of a belief in a Supreme
Being as being only explanatory and developed the psychological role
test for religion which requires that the belief occupy the same role for
the individual as is occupied by the more traditional religions in the lives
of their adherents. 24 In both Seeger and Welsh v. United States,25 a later
case, the interpretations of the statutory exemptions were so broad that it
appeared that any constitutional definition of religion would have to be
based on the psychological role that it played for the individual rather
than on some kind of content requirement such as a belief in a Supreme
Being. 26 Yoder, however, appears to have retreated somewhat from the
psychological role test, relying more on a content requirement test.27
In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger upheld the claim to free exercise in
reliance on the three hundred year history of the Amish faith, the un-
questioned sincerity with which the Amish held the religious belief that
secondary schooling would expose their children to detrimental worldli-
ness, and the centrality of this particular belief to the Amish religion and
way of life.28 While Yoder increased protection for conduct based on
religious belief, language in the opinion seems to require that the relig-
ious belief have some kind of institutional quality about it and that it not
Supreme Being was not required to qualify for the exemption. United States v. Kauten, 133
F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held, however, that the
existence of a religion depended on a belief in a Supreme Being. Berman v. United States,
156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 329 U.S. 795 (1946). Congress amended the exemption
in 1948 to require a belief in a Supreme Being. 62 Stat. 609 (1948) (codified in 50 App.
U.S.C. § 4560) prior to 1967 amendment). The Senate Armed Services Committee Report
indicated the adoption of Berman's interpretation of what constituted a religion. S. REP.
No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948). See Denno, Welsh Reaffirms Seeger From a
Remarkable Feat of Judicial Surgery to a Lobotomy, 46 IND. L.J. 37, 39-40 (1970); Defining
Religion, supra note 17, at 537 n.23.
23. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
24. d at 176.
25. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
26. See Gianella, supra note 6, at 1425; Hollingsworth, supra note 17, at 30; Pfeffer,
supra note 5, at 1136; Defining Religion, supra note 17, at 550-52.
Such an interpretation would have been in accord with the statement in Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961), that the establishment clause prohibited either a state or
the federal government from aiding "those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." In a footnote the Court re-
ferred to several religions that did not believe in God, such as Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture and Secular Humanism, and approvingly cited Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District
of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957), and Fellowship of Humanity v. County of
Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957). 367 U.S. at 495 n.ll.
27. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part).
28. Id at 235 (opinion of the Court).
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be based on a personal belief or philosophy. 29 This language may simply
reflect an attempt to determine the sincerity of the belief and its central-
ity to the religion, but taken at face value these requirements appear to
be a retrenchment from the very broad psychological role definitions of
religion used in the conscientious objector cases. 30
As the protection for conduct based on religious beliefs increased,
the Supreme Court was also affording more protection for persons who
were being discriminated against on the basis of race. Brown v. Board of
Education3' and its progeny not only prohibited segregation in public
schools, but gradually extended the prohibition to any racial discrimina-
tion supported by state action. As attempts to integrate the public schools
became more successful, more and more of those opposed to integration
placed their children in private schools. In Runyon v. McCrary,32 the
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 198133 prohibited private non-sec-
tarian commercially operated schools from excluding students on the ba-
sis of race. The schools' refusals to contract with applicants because of
their race violated the provision of section 1981 that all persons shall
have the same right to make and enforce contracts as do white citizens.
The schools were granted standing to litigate the free association claims
of the parents who sent their children to the schools,34 but the Court held
that the parents' rights of free association did not include protection for
the schools' exclusion of blacks.35 One of the questions specifically re-
29. One of the factors that the Court noted was that the beliefs were shared by an
organized group. Id. at 216. The Court also said that "if the Amish asserted their claims
because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and iso-
lated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's
choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to
the demands of the Religion Clauses." Id.
30. Justice Douglas pointed out that the majority's contention that Thoreau's choice
was merely personal and philosophical and therefore not entitled to protection under the
Religion Clauses was a retreat from the Court's opinions in Seeger and Welsh. 1d. at 247-
49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
33. See note 2, supra. Section 1981 is based on the thirteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution which provides:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
34. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. i60, 175 n.13 (1976).
35. Id. at 176. In granting standing to the schools in Runyon to litigate the constitu-
tional rights of the parents, the Court relied on Pierce P. Sociely of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
[Vol. 38
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served was whether section 1981 applied to private schools that practiced
racial exclusion on the basis of a religious belief.36
In Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc.,37 the full Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals was asked to answer this question regarding conflicts
between section 1981 and the right to the free exercise of religion.38 The
plurality avoided the question by finding that the evidence was sufficient
to support the trial court's conclusion that the discrimination at issue was
not based on a religious belief, but rather on a social policy or philoso-
phy.3 9 In reaching this conclusion the trial court isolated and analyzed
the beliefs attributed to the institution rather than those of the individual
parents, teachers and church members. The plurality agreed with the
trial court's approach, reasoning that a focus on the individual beliefs of
members would allow the institution to pick and choose which of its
members' religious beliefs it desired to exercise. 40 The plurality felt that
the existence of one individual who believed that his religion required
segregation should not authorize the entire institution to practice illegal
segregation. On the other hand, if an institution sincerely believed that
its religion mandated exclusion of blacks from the church school, the
existence of one member whose antipathy to integration was not relig-
iously based should not preclude the institution from claiming a right to
the free exercise of its religion.4
1
(1925). In Pierce, a statute prohibited parents from sending their children to a private
school, and the result would have been to abolish the private schools. The Court held that
the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the parents' liberty under the fourteenth amend-
ment to direct the upbringing of their children, relying on Meyer P. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). 268 U.S. at 534-35. In Runyon, the Court stated that the parents' rights of free
association only encompassed the right to send their children to a school that espoused
segregation, and did not include protection for the school's practice of segregation. 427 U.S.
at 176. Since the right of free association only protected the right to associate to promote a
particular belief, and since the school was not inhibited from teaching any beliefs that it
wished, the right of free association had not been violated.
36. 427 U.S. at 167.
37. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
38. The court summarily affirmed the trial judge's holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 pro-
hibited discrimination by private schools in light of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Runyon. Id. at 312.
39. Id. at 313.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 313-14. The issue whether an institution can claim an independent right of
free exercise was admitted by both the plurality and the concurring opinion to be a difficult
one. Id. at 313; id. at 316 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The plurality did not need to decide
the issue because it found the institution's policy to be a social policy. Id. at 313. The
concurring opinion did not have to decide the issue because it focused on the beliefs of the
individuals rather than the beliefs of the institution. Id. at 316 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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In focusing on the beliefs of the institution, the plurality examined
the testimony of the school's officers that racial discrimination was a pol-
icy that had only gradually evolved in the church. 42 Based on this testi-
mony, and the lack of any written evidence that segregation was a
religious tenet of the church or school, the plurality found that the policy
of discrimination was in fact just that, a social policy. 43 A statement by
the church pastor that he would follow the previous decisions of the
church unless instructed to do otherwise further convinced the plurality
that the exclusion of blacks was not religiously based. 44
In his concurrence, Judge Goldberg differed from the plurality by
focusing on the beliefs of the individuals rather than those of the institu-
tion and concluding that the school's exclusion of blacks was religiously
based.45 While declining to define religion, he criticized the plurality's
emphasis on written doctrine and found that "whatever the outer perim-
eters of the concept of 'religion,' the beliefs at issue here do not exceed
them."'46 The Biblical basis for the ideas, coupled with the testimony that
admission of blacks would constitute disobedience to God, made it clear
to Judge Goldberg that the individual beliefs were religious. 47 As long as
The issue has not been directly faced, but there have been cases indicating that a church
itself has protected freedoms under the first amendment. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952), the Court
said that the statute at issue in the case prohibited the "free exercise of an ecclesiastical
right, the Church's choice of its hierarchy." See also Goodson v. Northside Bible Church,
261 F. Supp. 99, 103 (S.D. Ala. 1966), afd 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Article or Device "Hubbard Electrometer," 333 F. Supp. 357, 363 (D.D.C. 1971).
42. 556 F.2d at 312-13.
43. Id. at 313.
44. Id at 312. In a footnote, the plurality acknowledged that the trial judge might have
found this statement to be simply a reflection of a congregational religion in which every
member was his own priest, but held that it was the trial judge's function to weigh the
evidence, while the appellate court's function was to determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to support his conclusions. Id. at 312 n.4. Judge Goldberg criticized the plural-
ity's standard of review, maintaining that the issue whether particular beliefs were religious
was a mixed question of law and fact necessitating an independent analysis of the evidence
by the court of appeals. He stated that the argument for independent review was especially
strong in this case since it involved first amendment rights. Further, because the trial court
had heard no live witnesses, but decided the case on the basis of depositions and exhibits
alone, the court of appeals was in just as good a position as the trial court to determine
facts. 1d at 316-17 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 315-16, 319-20. Judge Brown concurred in Part V of Judge Goldberg's con-
currence in which Judge Goldberg articulated the principles of balancing and concluded
that the "governmental interest in desegregation of schools outweighs the First Amend-
ment claim, if any, of the school, the church, or both." Id at 314 (Brown, J., concurring).
46. d. at 317-18 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
47. Id at 319-20. Each of the administrators and the church pastor expressed a belief
[Vol. 38
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some members held a religious belief mandating exclusion of blacks,
Judge Goldberg maintained that the school had standing to litigate their
free exercise claims; the extent to which these beliefs were or were not
generally held within the church would be one factor to be considered in
deciding the free exercise claim on its merits.48
Having found the actions to be religiously motivated, the concurring
opinion undertook a balancing of the religious and societal interests in-
volved.49 Courts have been reluctant to undertake this kind of balancing
because of the inherent subjectivity of religious beliefs and the danger
that an individual judge's biases might influence his analysis of the im-
portance of the interests involved.50 The inquiry in this case, however,
was aided by one witness's statement that the belief forbidding racial
"socialization" was only a "very minor" part of the religion.5l Although
admitting blacks would constitute disobedience to God, it would not en-
danger salvation, and consequently would not endanger the church's sur-
vival.52
Turning to the societal interests supporting the prohibition of racial
discrimination in private schools, Judge Goldberg found them to be of
the highest order because they drew strength not only from the congres-
sional judgment manifested in section 1981 but also from the thirteenth
amendment's abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude. 53 In re-
sponse to the school's argument that the governmental interest was lim-
that the Bible prohibited interracial marriage; consequently "socialization" that could lead
to interracial marriage, such as having blacks attend the school, was also prohibited. Id at
318-19.
48. Id. at 315 & nn.l & 2, 316 & n.4.
49. Id. at 321-24.
50. The resultant danger of favoritism again illustrates the tension between the free
exercise clause and the establishment clause. See note 18, supra.
51. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 321 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
52. d.
53. Id. at 323. "In ensuring blacks an equal opportunity to enter contracts, § 1981
seeks to eradicate some of the badges and incidents of slavery." Id.
Since section 1981 is undergirded by the thirteenth amendment, it would be possible to
phrase the balancing question in terms of whether the thirteenth amendment outweighs the
first amendment. Simply phrasing the question in this fashion illustrates the extreme diffi.
culty of balancing such enormous rights in the abstract. It is more realistic to focus on the
actual interests involved than to make a futile attempt to determine which right is more
important.
One possible way of dealing with the two rights in the abstract would be to say that the
thirteenth amendment, coming later, amended the first amendment pro tanto. A possible
response to this argument would be that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the rights
and liberties of the first amendment without any possible modifications by the thirteenth
1978]
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ited to having these two black children go to this particular church
school, Judge Goldberg discussed the possible institutional consequences
of a decision in favor of Dade Christian.54 He maintained that such a
decision would provide an avenue to avoid Runyon that many would use
in less than good faith, and might provoke a multitude of similar
claims.5 5 When faced with these future claims, courts either would have
to undertake a delicate case-by-case analysis of each claim, requiring the
courts to act as a "board of religious arbiters" 56 by drawing "fine and
searching distinctions," 57 or would have to recognize the validity of most
of the resulting similar claims, thereby seriously undermining the public
interest reflected in section 1981.58 Applying the test of Yoder that only
"those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served" can
overcome a claim to free exercise, 59 Judge Goldberg determined that in
this case the free exercise claim was outweighed since drawing fine and
searching distinctions in future cases would possibly violate the estab-
lishment clause. 60
The plurality's approach of focusing on the institutional beliefs
rather than the beliefs of the individual members appears sound. Al-
though the school has standing to litigate the free exercise rights of its
members, those individuals' rights should not protect the school's illegal
amendment. It is to be seriously doubted that any court would allow itself to be forced into
resolving a conflict between the two amendments in this fashion.
54. 556 F.2d at 323 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
55. d.
56. Id
57. Id at 324.
58. Id.
59. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
60. 556 F.2d at 323-24 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The dissenters agreed with Judge Goldberg that the policy was based on a religious
belief but voted to remand for further consideration. Id. at 324 (Roney, J., dissenting with
Judges Gewin, Coleman, Ainsworth, Clark and Tjoflat). For the dissenters, a religious be-
lief required a sincerely held belief "based on a theory 'of man's nature or place in the
Universe,'" (id, quoting Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146,
1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969)), that was not "merely a personal prefer-
ence but [had] an institutional quality about it." d
In attempting to determine whether the belief had an institutional quality about it, the
dissent focused on the institutional expressions of the belief in the church teachings and the
operation of the school. These institutional expressions--editing teaching materials, losing
a tax exemption and a sermon by the church pastor- proved that the institution held the
belief, but not that the belief was a religious belief.
Judge Goldberg was not willing to accept completely the dissenters' definition of relig-
ion. Id. at 317-18. However, a majority of the court agreed that the practice at issue was
based on a religious belief.
NOTES
discrimination. It is the school that is violating section 1981 by refusing
to contract with black applicants, not the individuals, and therefore it is
the school's illegal conduct that must be justified by some exception to
the general law. If a private tutor were to refuse to teach blacks for non-
religious reasons, the free exercise claim of one of his pupils' parents that
integration was forbidden by God surely would not be sufficient to pro-
tect the tutor's illegal discrimination. The analogy is somewhat different
from the instant case because Dade Christian is composed of individuals
whose free exercise rights it desires to exercise, whereas the relationship
between the tutor and his pupils' parents is only that of businessman and
client. However, Dade Christian should be viewed as a separate entity
that represents a single composite picture of its membership; when the
institution wishes to take action contrary to general laws it should be
required to show that such action is supported by a general religious
tenet of the institution and is thereby protected by the institution's free
exercise right.6 1 The right freely to exercise one's religion may excuse a
religious adherent from conduct which is required of or forbidden to all
others in the society; such an extensive right ought not to be conferred
lightly on a group unless there is evidence that the group's action is in
accord with its belief.
If focusing on institutional beliefs is proper when the institution is
seeking the religious exemption, the question then becomes how to deter-
mine which beliefs the institution adheres to and whether such beliefs
are truly religious. Beliefs the institution holds should normally be re-
flected either in writings or in long-standing practice. Contrary to Judge
Goldberg's fears,62 in unusual instances allowances could be made to
prevent this approach from becoming a burden on newly established re-
ligions simply by permitting the members of a newly established religion
to testify about the group's beliefs and the reasons for the religion's exist-
ence.
63
61. It is not clear whether an institution can have an independent right of free exercise
(see note 41, supra), but it is logical to assume that a religious group or institution that
wishes to take institutional action should have a free exercise right that is protected by the
first amendment. Such an interpretation would be in accord with the cases that have held
that a corporation is a person for the purpose of qualifying for the fourteenth amendment's
provision prohibiting deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. See
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
244 (1936); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898); Covington & Lexington Road Turn-
pike Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
62. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 317 (1977) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
63. Even a new religious institution will have some set of beliefs that acts as a cohesive
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When determining whether a particular institutional belief is relig-
ious it would seem preferable to examine the content of the belief rather
than the psychological role that it plays for the institution.64 Application
of the psychological role test would be unworkable because the existence
of an institution revolves around the purpose for which it was formed
and, consequently, an institution's purpose will always appear to occupy
the "psychological role" of a religion. For a business corporation the
creed of making money could be said to occupy the "psychological role"
of a religion. The most appropriate method of determining whether an
institution's beliefs are religious would be to discover whether the group
openly expresses sincere beliefs "based on a theory 'of man's nature or
his place in the Universe' "65 (not necessarily including a belief in a su-
pernatural power), and whether the group derives a moral practice from
the belief and is organized in a manner designed to foster adherence to
its tenets.66 If the court found that the institution was organized around
such a set of beliefs, 67 the only remaining inquiry would be whether the
belief at issue was within this set of religious beliefs.
Judge Goldberg's focus on the beliefs of the individuals rather than
the institution does not present serious balancing problems only because
of his conclusion that the free exercise claim would be outweighed by the
governmental interest expressed in section 1981 regardless of how many
people share the religious belief. His reasoning, following Runyon, is that
if one member believes that the particular action is religiously mandated,
then the institution has standing to litigate its members' rights and the
force among its members. These beliefs will either be recorded or recognized by the indi-
vidual members as the beliefs of the institution.
The focus on the institutional beliefs for the purposes of examining an institutional
claim to free exercise will not violate the establishment clause by discriminating against
religions without institutional form because this focus will only be necessary where institu-
tional action is contemplated and those religions without institutional form will be incapa-
ble of institutional action.
64. For a discussion of the psychological role definition of religion, see note 26, supra,
and accompanying text.
65. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 324 (1977) (Roney, J., dis-
senting), quoting Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
66. This test is a combination of the tests used in Brown v. Dade Christian Schools,
Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 324 (1977) (Roney, J., dissenting) and Fellowship ofHumanity v. County
of/lameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
67. This type of inquiry has already been faced in the tax exemption cases and has not
proved insurmountable. See Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d
127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d
673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
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court should reach the merits of the free exercise claim.68 Apparently,
considerations such as the number of people who share this religious
belief or oppose the conduct at issue are simply factors to be included in
the balancing process. 69 This approach is unsatisfactory because if an
institution were allowed an exemption from a generally applicable law
provided the pertinent religious beliefs were held by enough members,
the court would be required to make the difficult determination of what
percentage of members must share the belief in order to justify the ex-
emption for the institution. The determined percentage would surely
vary depending on whether there were other members who actually op-
posed the conduct (whether religiously or otherwise), and upon whether.
there were some who approved of the conduct, but only for nonreligious
reasons. These formulas seem to be only a disguised and not very accu-
rate method of determining whether the particular belief is held by the
institution or the group as a whole. A religion's tenets are not generally
determined by a vote of a majority and the courts should not examine
them in that light, but should focus instead on the institution as an en-
tity.70
68. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 315 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Goldberg, J., concurring). "The Runyon court required no showing of whether the stu-
dents and parents universally ascribed to the views espoused, and we should follow that
lead. If some students disagree with the rights that the school espouses. on behalf of others,
the balance of substantive interests may be affected, but the right ever to litigate the inter-
ests should not be foreclosed." Id
In another footnote, Judge Goldberg asserted that the difference between the associa-
tional rights at issue in Runyon and the religious rights asserted in the instant case is irrele-
vant to the standing issue. Id. at 315 n.l. However, this may not be true. If, in Runyon, one
parent had been held to have an associational right to send his child to a school that prac-
ticed segregation, then all of the other parents would have had that same right and the
schools would have.been allowed to segregate. However, in the case of a free exercise
claim, a finding that one person has a right to do something does not mean that others have
the same right. In fact, upholding a free exercise claim means that that particular person
has a right that is not shared by those who do not share his religious convictions. Therefore,
a finding in the instant case that one person has the free exercise right to send his child to a
segregated school ought not necessarily to mean that the school he wishes to attend will be
allowed to segregate. Even assuming that the free exercise rights of individuals could jus-
tify allowing an exemption for another entity (i.e. the institution), there should certainly be
a requirement that more than one individual hold the particular religious belief. Judge
Goldberg contends that this problem should be dealt with in the balancing process. Id. at
315 n.2. Perhaps the problems are an indication that the institution ought to be required to
make the free exercise claim on the basis of its institutional beliefs. At the very least, the
problems indicate that a resolution of the standing issue is very far from a resolution of the
free exercise claim itself.
69. Id. at 315 n.2.
70. In the case of a congregational religion where the members actually vote on the
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To justify his all or nothing approach, Judge Goldberg contended
that drawing fine distinctions between religions in future cases would
embroil the courts in religious questions that they are ill equipped to
handle.7 However, the most important differentiating factor in any case-
by-case analysis is the determination of the centrality of the belief at
issue. Judge Goldberg himself undertook such an inquiry in the instant
case before he ever reached the institutional problems that a decision in
favor of Dade Christian would entail. Having found the beliefs to be
religious and sincerely held, he focused on their centrality to the religion
and determined that the prohibition of "socialization" ''occupies a minor
position in its adherents' religion" 72 and is not essential to the church's
survival.73
Both the plurality and Judge Goldberg were probably correct in de-
nying Dade Christian an exemption: using the plurality's approach, the
belief was not religious; even accepting Judge Goldberg's approach, the
belief did not play a central role in the religion. However, Judge
Goldberg fails to present a convincing argument that the societal interest
represented by section 1981 outweighs every single claim that the right to
free exercise allows exclusion of blacks. The .rights at issue are both of
extreme importance: the right to contract without regard to the color of
one's skin, and the right to practice one's religion without state interfer-
ence. Where these two rights conflict only a delicate balancing of inter-
ests can justly resolved the conflict; a flexible rule is essential for a fair
result.
The case-by-case analysis required has been undertaken by other
courts in the context of free exercise claims. 74 The essential prelude to
the balancing, despite its dangers, is the search for centrality, which is the
critical factor in determining the strength of the free exercise claim. The
outcome of the balancing should depend on the centrality of the particu-
lar belief to the religion as a whole, weighed against the extent to which
important societal interests would be harmed by upholding the free exer-
church beliefs there will be no difference between looking at the institutional beliefs of the
church and taking a head count of what the individual members believe to be a part of
their religion. However, in that instance the group will have agreed that the beliefs of the
group will be whatever a majority of the group believes.
71. 556 F.2d at 323 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 322.
73. Id. at 321.
74. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); In re Jenison, 267
Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
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cise claim. 75 The harm that will be caused to the particular religion by
denying the free exercise claim increases in proportion to the centrality
of the belief at issue, while the societal interests in preventing an exemp-
tion increase in proportion to the number of schools that might escape
the general prohibition against discrimination in private schools. Per-
haps under some circumstances, where there is a central religious belief
mandating the exclusion of blacks from one particular church school,
allowing an exemption would not seriously undermine the societal inter-
est in assuring that all children, regardless of race, can attend the school
of their choice. 76 Unless and until the free exercise exemptions multiply
enough to effect some serious detriment to the societal interest in pro-
moting equality for people of all races, the courts ought to fufill" the
promise of the first amendment by allowing discrimination in such
cases.7 7 As long as the courts require the belief to be both sincere and
central to the religion, there seems little chance that the resulting free
exercise claims would be numerous enough to impair substantially the
important interests promoted by section 1981. 78 To deny these free exer-
cise claims in all instances appears to constitute discrimination against
some religions based on the fact that a particular religious tenet is at
odds with what many in this country believe. A delicate case-by-case
75. In Wisconsin P. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for example, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the centrality of the beliefs to the religion and, in light of the beliefs centrality
and the minimal effect of the desired exemption, found the governmental interest out-
weighed.
76. The interests of the free exercise claimants would very likely outweigh the govern-
mental interest if the institution that wished to exclude blacks limited its school enrollment
to church members.
77. This is the test that was used by the Minnesota Supreme Court in allowing a free
exercise claimant to be exempted from jury duty after the United States Supreme Court
had remanded for further consideration in light of Sherbert. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136,
125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
78. One problem that may arise is that a church that has obtained an exemption might
be flooded with new members wishing to take advantage of the exemption. One possible
remedy to such a situation would be for a court to rescind the exemption on the basis that
the religious nature of the institution's belief had become a sham because of a dramatic
change in the membership of the church. Although counting heads is not a good way to
determine the content of an institutional belief, it is relevant to the issue whether the insti-
tutional belief is sincere. An alternative approach to this type of abuse is the argument that
changing circumstances had shifted the balance so that the free exercise claim was not
outweighed by the governmental interest. If the abuse was serious then a court would prob-
ably be able to withdraw the exemption on one of these two grounds.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
balancing is the only way to implement the protection for the free exer-
cise of religion afforded by the first amendment.
William W Pugh
DEFENDANT-WITNESSES, CONFESSIONS, AND A LIMITED SCOPE OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Appellant was indicted for first degree murder and, prior to trial,
moved to suppress a statement made to police.' An evidentiary hearing
on this 'motion was held at which appellant testified and was cross-ex-
amined on whether the statement was voluntary. The trial judge denied
the motion, finding the confession to have been voluntary, and the prose-
cution introduced evidence at trial to show that the confession was freely
given. 2 Appellant's motion to testify for the limited purpose of rebutting
the prosecution's evidence concerning the confession's voluntariness was
denied, and defendant appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court on that
question alone. In a prospective decision,3 the court held that in order to
enable a jury to determine the weight to be given a confession, an ac-
cused must be allowed to testify on the voluntariness and validity of the
confession, and may be cross-examined only on the issues of voluntari-
ness and credibility, including prior convictions. State v. Lovett, 345 So.
2d 1139 (La. 1977).
Louisiana criminal procedure entitles a defendant in a criminal
prosecution to a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the question
of the admissibility of his confession.4 This determination of admissibil-
I. It was appellant's contention that the statement given to the police was involuntary
because the police took at least one other unrecorded statement from him prior to giving
the Miranda warnings. Furthermore, appellant alleged that he was promised leniency if he
would cooperate by confessing and was threatened with physical harm. 345 So. 2d at 1144.
2. LA. CODE CRIUM. P. art. 703(B) requires the state to show at trial the circumstances
surrounding the making of a written confession or inculpatory statement where a ruling on
a motion to suppress is adverse to the defendant. This showing is to enable the jury to
determine the weight to be given the statement.
3. The court reached its decision on January 24, 1977, and applied it prospectively,
thus affirming appellant's conviction. On rehearing, however, appellant's conviction was
reversed. This reversal was in response to the complaint that the prospective nature of the
decision constituted dicta, which, said the court, was error in law. 345 So. 2d at 1144.
4. In Brown v. Mississippi 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the United States Supreme Court held
that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution prohibits the use of an involun-
tary confession to convict a defendant in a state criminal proceeding. The minimum stan-
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